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Species

Interspecies Political Agency in
the Total Liberation Movement
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine the possibility of interspecies political
agency at the level of social movements. We ask to what extent animals and humans can be co-participants in one another’s liberation
from oppression. To do so, we assess arguments for and against including animals in the ‘total liberation package,’ taken as the liberation from oppressive societal structures. These are not pragmaticpolitical arguments, but conceptual-philosophical arguments that
have been put before animal liberationists attempting to ‘piggy-back’
on human liberation movements. In discrediting these philosophical
arguments, we argue that animals have capacities for self-liberation
that humans can facilitate and that animals, in turn, can facilitate
human liberation. As such, we defend the coherence of a total liberation package linking all oppression and all liberation, animal and
human. We further argue that the rhetoric of total animal/human liberation performs a vital function in creating unity and solidarity between otherwise disparate and fragmented social justice movements.
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Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the concept of total liberation (Best
2014, Pellow 2014) has emerged as the theoretical foundation
for radical earth and animal liberation movements. This posits the conceptual linkage or interconnection of all oppressions
and all liberations. In this respect, it makes a claim that is not
merely historical and sociological: that diverse forms of oppression have similar historical origins and depend on a particular
“logic of domination” (Kalof et al. 2004, p. 239). Instead, it
claims an inherent interconnectedness (Cochrane 2016, Noske
1997) of all oppressions and liberations such that each logically
intersects with the others to form a totality (Krinsky 2013). Indeed, this notion of logical interconnectedness serves strategic
purposes for radical earth and animal liberation movements
who unite under a shared semantic or a ‘constitutive master
frame’ for injustices (Mooney & Hunt 1996).
Such a “shared language of connection” (Barker et al. 2013,
p. 29) may unite diverse movements today. Nevertheless, the
alliance sometimes obscures disparities between separated
streams of activists based on their degree of radicalism, modus operandi or particular cause (cf.Mertes 2004, on the intrapolitics of social movements). This fragmentation of social
movements, all advocating for total liberation, frequently results from an effort by other actors – particularly the state – to
atomize movements and sever linkages in order to contain or
neutralize them (Galtung 1990). However, advocates of those
progressive social movements with which it seeks alliances
sometimes also criticize the total liberation frame for being excessively broad. They criticize it for ignoring significant conceptual and moral differences between the cases of oppression
it seeks to link. Linkages represent desperate attempts to “…
piggy-back on other social justice causes” (Brisman 2010). In-
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deed, some animal rights activists criticize the total liberation
frame for fundamentally misusing the language of liberation
as applicable only to normal adult humans (Cochrane 2009).
These criticisms result in the continued fragmentation of animal and human liberation movements and the reproduction of
an animal/human divide. At best, critics declare such inclusive
movements attempt to “do too much,” bewildering the landscape of justice (Choudry & Shragge 2011).
In this paper, we examine but reject the more cutting conceptual criticisms directed toward the total animal/human
liberation package by diverse social justice and animal rights
advocates from across the political spectrum. Indeed, we combine animal and human liberation in a conceptually coherent
package. Its coherence is grounded, in part, in animal studies arguing for moral equivalency across human and animal
injustices (Pellow 2014) as well as in the under-acknowledged
agency of animals in protesting, breaking free, or even liberating other animals (Hribal 2013). Nevertheless, we argue that
it is also grounded in the political literature’s stretching of the
boundaries around what constitutes an act of resistance/liberation (Hollander & Einwohner 2004), thus inviting examples of
animal liberations in which humans and non-human animals
are both active co-participants and animals are co-dependents:
in interdependent liberation agency. All of this leads us to declare that partitioning the total liberation package into irreconcilable or morally non-equivalent compartmentalized struggles
across different species is an unhelpful and incorrect discrimination to perpetrate today (cf. Hadley 2017). We write our essay in the intersections of social movement studies, humananimal studies and political theory, aiming to contribute to new
ways of conceptualizing the rising field of radical animal rights
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activism and direct-action animal abolitionists, as well as its
potential alliances on the social movement landscape.
Our essay is an entry to the growing field of political animal
studies, spurred by a ‘political turn’ in animal rights (Kymlicka
2017). We focus on the question of animal rather than earth
liberation for practical reasons. We assume that the conceptual
problems with incorporating non-human animals into a total
liberation package will also extend to incorporating plants and
ecosystems into such a package, given these ostensibly all lack
agency comparable to humans. However, we do not make that
argument here. Instead, we are concerned specifically with
evaluating the purported conceptual linkages or interconnections between the oppression and liberation of non-human and
human animals. These are, after all, united in the common experience of sentience and are different only in degree and not
kind (Petulla 1989).
We proceed as follows. First, we sketch the program for total
liberation as it has emerged from the radical earth and animal
liberation movements. Second, we narrow our focus on animal
liberation in the context of the total liberation package, laying
out and evaluating arguments against the conceptual interrelatedness of animal and human liberation. Third, we reevaluate
the concept of total liberation in light of these criticisms.

What is Total Liberation?
The Earth Liberation Front first stated the total liberation
concept in 2001 as follows:
We want to be clear that all oppression is linked, just
as we are all linked, and we believe in a diversity
of tactics to stop earth rape and end all domination.
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Together we can destroy this patriarchal nightmare,
which is currently in the form of techno-industrial
global capitalism.
Responding to this statement, Pellow (2014) proposes that
total liberation comprises four pillars:
1. ethics of justice and anti-oppression inclusive of
humans, nonhuman animals, and ecosystems;
2. anarchism;
3. anti-capitalism;
4. embrace of direct-action tactic (p. 4).
Here, we take it that 1) it is a neutral restatement concerning
the linkage of all oppressions. By itself, this need not entail
commitments to 2) - 4). After all, ‘an ethic of justice and antioppression inclusive of humans and nonhumans could, in principle, be embraced by those who accept the legitimate authority of the state and who deny capitalism is necessarily opposed
to the demands of morality and justice. Nevertheless, Pellow
specifically ties total liberation to anarchism and anti-capitalism. Best (2014) does the same. Both explain this tie to anarchism and anti-capitalism in light of the frustration of radical
earth and animal activists with “the elitism, racism, and tactical reformism of mainstream animal rights and environmental
movements” (Pellow 2014, p. 4). Indeed, to them, mainstream
ecological and animal rights movements, like Greenpeace,
“lack awareness of and commitment to anti-oppression politics” and embrace “state-centric and market oriented solutions”
(Ibid), leading to their co-optation by the system and the erosion of their integrity (Johansen & Martin 2008).
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To radical animal liberationists, these insider tactics are insufficient to address the present ecological crisis or respond
to the gross injustices and exploitation suffered by non-human
animals. On this view, there are no effective market-oriented
solutions. Markets are structured by the hierarchical state
dominated by the profit-motives of powerful corporate elites.
Indeed, a common theme in the total liberation literature is
that representative democracy is a myth (Best 2014) and that
the state and markets are ultimately unresponsive to alternative
ideas and values. At most, market solutions pay lip service
to ecological ideas and values, while continuing with business
as usual. Consequently, deep skepticism about the state and
markets motivates tying total liberation to anarchism and anticapitalism.
What, however, about anti-capitalism and the aspiration of
total liberationists to ‘destroy the patriarchal nightmare’ that
is capitalism? Total liberation is influenced deeply by ecofeminist thought and the central role it assigns to patriarchy
in explaining diverse oppressions. According to eco-feminism,
patriarchy is the core not only of women’s oppression but also
of animals and general nature (Adams 1993). (Gruen 2007) articulates the concept of total liberation from an eco-feminist
perspective when she writes:
Women, people of color, queers, non-human animals are
all thought to be lower in the hierarchy than white, heterosexual, able-bodied men. The conceptual tools and institutional
structures that maintain the status of these men are employed
against women and animals. Oppression of any of these groups
is thus linked, and if one is opposed to sexism, racism, and
heterosexism, etc. she should also oppose speciesism (p. 336).
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Here, the primary conceptual tool of patriarchy in “post-Medieval Western male psychology” (Donovan 2007, p. 65) is the
idea that reason can and indeed should dominate nature. Closer
to nature, women -- like non-human animals -- should thus be
the objects of domination by men. However, the preeminent
expression of this patriarchal male psychology of domination
through reason is the efficient capitalist exploitation of the
earth’s resources, including those trillions of animals harvested for human consumption each year in factory farms that are
effectively an Eternal Treblinka for animals (Patterson 2002).
As the ultimate expression of patriarchal domination, the institutional structures of capitalism, such as factory farms that
answer only to the profit motive of elite corporations, must be
destroyed rather than reformed.
It is often argued, following Galtung (1990), that animals
must be liberated from such conditions because they ultimately
experience violence in the same dimensions and by many of
the same mechanisms of injustice as humans: direct, structural
and cultural. These denote immediate harm to their physical
well-being, such as slaughter, hunting and abuse; structural
harms from displacement or loss of habitat following industrial development or climate change; and cultural harm on the
level of societal discourses blinding us to the violence we inflict upon animals. In an example of the latter, capitalism and
a commodity logic condition us on a level of language to think
of pigs as ‘pork,’ calf as ‘veal,’ chicken as ‘poultry,’ and more
(Adams 1993). Even if not all animals can approximate the full
range of suffering from such harm as humans (a pig does not
suffer psychologically if it is termed pork), they manifestly experience the effects of violence that such schemes enable. This
leads scholars to declare that human and animal predicaments
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under capitalism are comparable in terms of harm and that liberation for both is required.
What about Pellow’s fourth pillar, direct action? Why
should total liberation be tied to this as opposed, say, to civil
disobedience or armed rebellion against the state and the capitalist mode of production? Earth and animal liberationists are
willing to engage in direct acts of trespass, theft, sabotage, and
confrontation or intimidation, but they repudiate physical violence against persons (Pellow 2014). Unlike nonviolent civil
disobedience, they do not affirm the legitimacy of the state
principle of the rule of law (Rawls 1971). Unlike armed rebels,
they do not seek the replacement of one form of the state with
another. To this extent, their goal is to create a better world,
but not through reforming or replacing the state. They take
direct action to do the right thing when the state fails to deliver
justice.
This explains the strikingly negative orientation of the original 2001 statement of the total liberation project. Rather than
offering a future utopian blueprint (Pellow 2014; Best 2014),
total liberation is, above all, a commitment to physically ‘stopping’ injustice and to doing so now through direct action, when
necessary. Indeed, we shall return to this point in the third section of this paper, discussing an alternative positive orientation
to total liberation. Having laid out the total liberation program,
we turn next to criticisms of its logical coherence focusing specifically on the inclusion of animal liberation in the total liberation package.
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Arguments against including Animals in a Total
Liberation Package
Not all arguments against including animal liberation in
the total liberation package are concerned with the question of
logical or conceptual coherence. Indeed, some arguments are
pragmatic. For example, time and resources devoted to animal
liberation come at the expense of time and resources devoted to
human liberation – say, the struggles against racism or sexism.
Likewise, championing the cause of animal liberation will diminish the currency of justice, eroding the seriousness with
which human injustices are treated (Arluke 2002). There is also
a substantial body of scholarship and movement observations
that critique the relatively privileged socioeconomic status of
many animal rights activists—who are overwhelmingly white
middle-class—as compared to human liberationists who come
from diverse backgrounds (Emel & Wolch 1998, Guither 1998).
That said, however, we address not empirical but rather conceptual arguments concerning the coherence of including animals in a total liberation package from the perspective of both
the non-anarchist left and mainstream and bourgeois political
thought. We divide our discussion into three categories. These
concern (1) the status of animal liberation with a project of opposing the systemic interconnectedness of oppression; (2) the
purported absence of logical connections between the oppression of animals and of humans based on morally significant
species differences; and (3) the purported absence of logical
connections between animals having rights and their being the
subjects, as opposed to objects, of liberation.
We begin then with a basic criticism of radical animal liberationist from the non-anarchist left, challenging its status as
a component of any total, anti-systemic liberation campaign.
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Indeed, we distinguish between the ‘non-anarchist’ left committed to system-replacement in 1) and 2) and mainstream
or bourgeois theorists committed to system reform in 3). As
anarchists, radical animal liberationists oppose both the nonanarchist left and the bourgeois mainstream.
Animal Liberation is not an Anti-systemic Movement
Given its emphasis on the interconnectedness of all oppression, total liberation might seem to be an anti-systemic movement in Wallerstein (2002)’s sense. That is, rather than a singleissue movement, it seems to address the interconnected system
of oppression and exploitation: race, ethnicity, sex, gender,
class, age, and species. However, critics of the animal liberation movement’s claim to solidarity with human liberation suggest that this is misleading. Appearances to the contrary, they
posit that animal liberation is not part of an anti-systemic or
total liberation movement, but instead remains a single-issue
movement.
Indeed, according to Fotopoulos and Sargis (2006), animal
liberationists resorting to direct action target “crucial political
and economic institutions of the system” (2006, p.1). Nevertheless, that “does not by itself render this single-issue movement
into an anti-systemic one” (Ibid). Indeed, animal liberation is
not anti-systemic unless it aims to become an organic part of
“a universal project to replace the present system” (Ibid; our
italics), in light of some utopian blueprint. As we have seen,
however, earth and animal liberationists claiming to function
as part of a total liberation movement do not have this aim or
aspiration; they rather disrupt daily practices. Indeed, animal
liberation is described as a “stop-gap measure” (Liszt 1990, p.
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164) or as “cessation” (Magel 1988, p.205). Consequently, they
are not genuinely anti-systemic, total liberationists.
What should we make of this argument? One might object
that it works only by definitional fiat. If total, anti-system liberation entails replacing the present system, then animal liberationists who subscribe the Pellow’s four pillars cannot also
be total liberationists. Nevertheless, it appears arbitrary to insist that total liberation must entail replacing the system rather
than acting independently of it or sometimes with or through it.
The anarchist pillar expresses deep skepticism about any statemanaged system – capitalist or socialist – delivering justice.
Given this anti-statist assumption, the best hope for delivering
justice to the victims of interlinked oppression does not lie in
replacing one state system with another. Consequently, those
subscribing to the four pillars might insist they are genuinely
anti-systemic because they do not merely oppose the present
system, but rather all state-managed systems.
Absence of any Logical Connection between Animal and
Human Liberation
The second line of argumentation against including animals
in a total liberation package questions the coherence of treating
animal and human liberation as morally equivalent. Indeed,
animal liberation is motivated primarily through the idea that
our present treatment of animals is based on speciesism. As
for discrimination in favor of the human species over all other
species, speciesism is equivalent to racism as discrimination in
favor of one’s race over other races or sexism as discrimination
in favor of one’s gender over the other, and so on (Horta 2010).
Discrimination based on race, sex, and species thus results in
linked oppressions insofar as they entail an equivalent moral
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error. This, of course, presupposes that discrimination violates
some principle of moral equivalency applicable to the totality of linked oppressions. In this respect, animal liberationists typically appeal to a principle of equal consideration based
on sentience or selfhood. Hence, different races, sexes, and
different species are all entitled to equal consideration due to
their equal capacities for suffering or self-consciousness (Pluhar 1988). Nevertheless, many leftist and mainstream theorists
contest this claim to equal consideration.
In both cases, an appeal is made to the higher-level cognitive
capacities of humans as a morally relevant difference. Above
the level of sentience and self-consciousness, these are capabilities for linguistic communication, abstract reasoning, longterm planning, and entering into moral agreements (Scruton
2000). Indeed, these are all capabilities for political agency or
active political participation. In other words, they are prerequisites for participation in a liberation struggle. Leftist critics
of animal liberation assign considerable importance to distinctively human capabilities for political agency. From a leftist
perspective, liberation struggles are crucial undertakings by
the oppressed to liberate themselves (Fotopoulos & Sargis
2006, Staudenmaier 2003). This is not to say that dissident
members of an oppressor class or race do not also play a role in
liberating the oppressed (Vanderheiden 2005). Nevertheless,
the latter should not attempt to co-opt or direct the movement,
but rather defer to the actual subjects of oppression as political
agents in their own right. That, however, is impossible in the
case of animal liberation, who cannot lead such movements
autonomously.
On this argument, animals are never the “subjects” of a
liberation movement: instead, “they can only be its objects”
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(Fotopoulos and Sargis 2006, p. 4). Here, the rank impossibility of animals becoming political agents and subjects of their
own liberation undermines the moral equivalency of speciesism with racism and sexism. Racist and sexist societies are
examples of heteronomous societies denying the autonomy of
humans based on race and sex. Indeed, to the extent that all
humans possess capabilities for autonomy and political agency
regardless of race and sex, these are heteronomous societies
that could be autonomous or liberated societies. However, the
same cannot be said about a purportedly ‘speciesist’ society.
Animals necessarily remain heteronomous in their relations to
us: these are not heteronomous relations that could be autonomous. Consequently, speciesism is not morally equivalent to
racism and sexism. The political order of society is necessarily
anthropocentric, but that does not mean animals are therefore
the subject of an arbitrary bias or prejudice on the part of humans. This is not to deny that there are “legitimate reasons
to abstain from eating meat or to oppose cruelty to animals”
(Staudenmaier 2003). It is to assert the “incommensurability”
of animal and human liberation paradigms (Ibid; Fotopoulos and Sargis 2006). Based on considerations of autonomy
and political agency, the defense of anthropocentrism is also
stressed by mainstream or bourgeois critics of animal liberation: while they are certainly owed kindness and even certain
rights, horses cannot vote (Evans 2005, Fjellstrom 2002, Scruton 2000).
Nevertheless, these arguments do not explicitly deny that
animals could be liberated. At most, they establish that there
is no conceptual interdependency between animal and human
liberation at the level of political agency. Even if they are not
subjects of their own liberation as autonomous political agents,
animals might still be liberated by humans from cruel treat-
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ment at the hands of other humans. In this respect, “the liberation of humans is a precondition for the liberation of animals,”
but “not vice versa” (Fotopoulos and Sargis 2006, pp. 2-3;
their emphasis). Nevertheless, the oppression and liberation
of animals remain linked to human liberation, albeit through
a relation of dependency rather than equality. This does not
undermine the concept of total liberation from all oppressions
as much as cause us to reconceive the links between animal
and human liberation in terms of priority and dependency relations. This line of argument is also not unique to animals; Liszt
(1990) makes the important point that liberation is a response
to structural violence and that objects of structural violence –
be they human or non-human – “can be persuaded to notice
nothing at all” as part of this violence (p. 164). This implies that
victims of oppression do not need to internalize their injustice,
as someone may recognize it on their behalf, which is demonstrably the case with animal liberation.
Animal Rights and Liberation can be De-coupled
The third and final argument against including animals in
the total liberation package comes from an influential argument from Cochrane (2009). This is not an argument from the
non-anarchist left concerned with the priority of human over
animal liberation, but rather mainstream bourgeois ethics concerned primarily with the value of autonomy for individual
human persons. While he does not specifically address the
total liberation program, Cochrane’s argument is potentially
devastating because it purports to refute the intelligibility of
‘liberating’ non-autonomous animals. They obviously cannot
be incorporated into a package of total liberation if they cannot be liberated. Cochrane’s argument proceeds by denying
that rights-holders must have any complex cognitive capacities
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for moral and rational agency. To this extent, he effectively
de-couples having a right from individual autonomy. He then
argues non-autonomous rights-holders -- including most (if not
all) animals -- have no intrinsic interest in liberty and, as such,
any movement or struggle for their liberation. Indeed, the
concept of liberation applies only to autonomous agents with
higher-order capacities for rationality.
Hence, it is intelligible to say that a human slave can be liberated from the condition of slavery because she can be liberated to exercise her capabilities of autonomy free from the
arbitrary interference of a master. However, it is unintelligible
to talk about liberating non-autonomous domesticated animals.
Whether they realize it or not (Feinberg 1974) such animals
have interests in remaining under the care of human owners
as long as they are treated humanely. Such dependency relations under the care of humans are a distinct improvement over
the suffering they would otherwise experience if they were
returned to the wild and exposed to hostile nature (Cochrane
2009, Giroux 2016). In sum, according to Cochrane, animals
have rights to humane treatment, but this has nothing to do
with liberating them to live lives that they choose freely just
like emancipated slaves or emancipated women. On the contrary, liberty and liberation are of no interest to non-autonomous animals as opposed to autonomous humans.

Animal and Human Liberation Realigned
We argue now for three interrelated claims: (1) that animals
are agents in their own liberation; (2) that autonomy over-determines the concept of liberation such that it is meaningful
to talk about liberation without autonomy; (3) that animal liberation is consistent with non-paternalistic relations of dependency on humans to help or assist in an inter-species liberation
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struggle. If we are successful, then we will have made significant progress towards a coherent total animal and human total
liberation package.
Regarding (1), we stress some animal rights scholars have
argued that animals can be active agents in their own liberation, given they display preferences for freedom through exit
signals like ‘voting with their feet’ (Hribal 2013, Meijer 2013,
Warren 2011). Indeed, they contend that construing resistance
in terms of a human-led political liberation misses the speciesspecific styles of communication that animals use to assert
protest (Driessen 2014). This is noted by scholars studying plural expressions of human protest, direct action, and liberation
forms. They argue there is a need to consider the full array
of ‘voice’ employed by individuals, especially those with few
political resources, of which animals seem a prime example
(Tsai 2012). In this view, voice may be non-verbal and nonlinguistic. It is enough, for example, that one’s direct action liberation speaks for itself, insofar as it emits a “silent signal that
exit generates” (Warren 2011, p. 693) and that escape is very
much a key strategy of resistance that has political meaning
(Hardt 1992). Insofar as some concede liberty may be less important to animals than to humans, they note this cannot be an
across-the-board assertion; it is true that to a dog, a condition
of benevolent domination may be preferable to release, but for
wild animals autonomy, liberty and sovereignty appear critical to their species flourishing (Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011,
Palmer 2010).
Further, regarding intentionality, some scholars include animal liberation within the remit of ‘accidental resistance’ (cf.
Kumar 2013 for this concept in the human context, Lilja et al.
2013). They argue that one primary determinant of an action’s
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political content is, in fact, the societal and political reception
it receives from authorities, media or wider publics (Tafon &
Saunders 2015). This means that the instigator is not usually the
one who has the power to designate their action as a political/
anarchist act of liberation; this occurs also through retrospective resolving of events (Hájek et al. 2014). They note that it is
virtually impossible to access the presemiotic intent of resisters, thus calling for the necessary co-construction of a political
meaning for the act (Vinthagen & Johansson 2013). While this
should not open up an ‘everything can be resistance’ perspective, it does cast doubt on the Rawlsian prerequisite of rational
autonomous political agency necessarily preceding the act. For
animals, the implications are clear. They scarcely intend their
exits and self-liberation to be political statements. They are not
the consequences of ‘moral commitment’ (Kumar 2013). But
research shows diverse animals, from apes to octopi, express
clearly preferences for freedom, planning escape attempts, and
even attempts to break out other animals in the enclosure.
Hence, regarding (2), we contend it is sufficient to say that
acts of accidental or non-political resistance are properly selfliberation acts. To be sure, they are not preferences for autonomy equivalent to the preferences of oppressed slaves or women. Nevertheless, that is beside the point. As preferences for
freedom, animals express desires for their own freedom from
conditions they experience as unwanted and constraining; conditions from which they are agents of their liberation. To this
extent, we see no compelling reason to restrict the language of
liberation to actions intended as political statements and based
on moral commitments. We see that as an arbitrary over-determination of what it means for an agent to free herself from
a given set of unwanted conditions or circumstances. Indeed,
Cochrane (2009) over-determines the concept of liberation by
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arbitrarily insisting that the agent or instigator of her own liberation must also be the societal designator of her action as a
liberation action.
Still, actions alone may be insufficient to link them to the
political movement of animal liberation, which entails goals
that are considerably more abstract. Regarding (3), then, we
suggest this is where humans’ role in animal liberation appears. Not only do animal activists participate physically in
the releases of animals, but they also give meaning to these
acts. While often eager to escape, most animals could probably rarely orchestrate their escape attempts alone and thus rely
on human-dependent agency. Equally, however, the liberation
act would not be complete without the animals; human agency
alone is not enough. Consequently, we argue that the action is
a function of dependent or interdependent agency: animals and
humans depend on each other for the action to be realized as a
liberation. Dependent agency now represents a recurring and
instructive line of argument within animal studies that opens
up for new ways to understand animals’ expressions, autonomy
and interests (Meijer 2013). Here, human assistance is non-paternalistic to the extent that humans take their ‘cue’ from the
animals.
Is such assistance consistent with the idea of interlocking
oppressions and liberations crossing the species divide? We
say it affects considerable progress in that direction: animal
and human agency intertwine in a liberation act. Nevertheless,
it might still be objected that we have only shown it meaningful
and coherent to say that humans are participants in animal liberation, despite species differences in capabilities for autonomy. We have not shown that animals are participants in the liberation of humans. However, this is not an absurd proposition.
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Psychological research shows that “reducing the status divide
between animals and humans” can help “reduce prejudice and
strengthen belief in equality between human groups” (Kymlicka & Donaldson 2014, p. 120). Indeed, through our interactions
with them (Wright 2017) animals can potentially help humans
liberate themselves from their racism, sexism, homophobia,
and so on. In other words, humans may depend on the agency of non-autonomous animals for their spiritual liberation as
much as animals depend on autonomous humans – albeit for
different sorts of liberations. This much seems particularly
salient in modernity, where nature reconciliation and reconnecting with animals is increasingly championed as a cure for
the ‘disease’ of modern society and the systemic shackles of
oppression that many believe characterizes our industrial society (Swan 1995).

Conclusions
Our paper reviewed the philosophical arguments sounded
by critics for keeping separate animal liberation and human
liberation on grounds that they are morally non-equivalent and
that it is incoherent to see them as fundamentally interrelated.
We then engaged in arguments for keeping them together, examining the capacities of non-autonomous animals for selfliberation and reassessing the meaning of the term liberation
without the over-determined requirement of autonomy. Ultimately, we found philosophical support for linking these two
movements as champions of the total liberation concept.
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